Notes in Defense of the Iraq Constitution by Hamoudi, Haider Ala
HAMOUDI_FINAL.DOC 10/6/2011 1:02 PM 
 
1277 
NOTES IN DEFENSE OF THE IRAQ CONSTITUTION 
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI* 
1. ON THE NECESSITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
This paper is a defense of sorts of the Iraqi constitution, 
arguing that the language used in it was wisely designed to allow 
some level of flexibility, such that the constitution could evolve as 
social and political circumstances necessitated.  The point is more 
than a theoretical one.  Enormous changes in the political 
landscape and understandings of popular will have occurred, and 
due to the flexibility of the language, the Constitution has not only 
survived them, but has had its own legitimacy considerably broadened 
as a result. 
Such thoughts seem tantamount to a form of academic heresy.  
Offering kind words on the Iraq constitution is not often done in 
our current academic and media environment.  From its very 
inception, the constitution has been dismissed as shamelessly 
imposed upon an unwilling identitarian community—the Arab 
Sunnis—1 conceived in a “veritable pathology of legality”2 and 
likely to bring about, as the title of one work put it, “The End of 
Iraq.”3  The latter view in particular has been all but proven 
demonstrably wrong: Iraq’s Constitution has passed its half decade 
mark, and Iraq is, by all accounts, far more secure, centralized, and 
confident in its position as a nation state than it was when the 
Constitution was drafted.  Ethnic and sectarian violence no longer 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  The 
author would like to thank Michael Dorf, Jules Lobel, George Taylor, and the 
participants in the Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
their helpful comments and suggestions.  Special thanks to my research assistant, 
Eryn Correa, without whose assistance this Article would never have been 
completed on schedule. 
1 Feisal Istrabadi, A Constitution without Constitutionalism: Reflections on Iraq’s 
Failed Constitutional Process, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1628–29 (2008). 
2 Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, 
51 N.Y.L.S. REV. 535, 551 (2007). 
3 See PETER GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ 206 (2006) (indicating that there will 
be “little reason to mourn Iraq’s passing”). 
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reigns on Iraq’s streets as they once did.4  Foreign investment has 
become less of a theoretical possibility and more of an emerging 
reality.5  All identitarian communities participate fully in electoral 
events, the threat of boycotts seems to have disappeared entirely.6 
Despite these several not insignificant gains,7 characterizations 
of the Constitution that served as the founding document of the 
nation during the relevant period have hardly grown any more 
charitable.  Through my participation at the September 2010 
Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School (“Penn Conference”), I 
heard denunciations of provisions of the Constitution that might in 
some but not all cases be characterized as strident.  Had they been 
made by those ignorant of Iraq’s history, law, or politics, they 
might well be disregarded.  When made, as they were, by 
individuals whose knowledge of and dedication to Iraq, over the 
course of decades in some cases, has been nothing short of 
remarkable, I feel compelled to stake my ground, offering the bases 
my respectful dissent from the groupthink with care and due 
reverence for their considerable achievements although their views 
do not accord with my own. 
From Jason Gluck, I learned that the Constitution’s flaws 
include an inability of the central government to tax,8 a point 
 
4 Sam Dagher, Iraqis Face Uncertain Future as U.S. Ends Combat Mission, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704913 
704575453303215595156.html. 
5 Zainab Fattah, Lafarge to Raise Iraq Cement Capacity by 2 million tons by 2013, 
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-30 
/lafarge-to-raise-iraq-cement-capacity-by-2-million-tons-by-2013.html. 
6 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Iraqi Sunni Leaders Urge Participation in 
Next Election, GLOBAL SECURITY, July 14, 2005, http://www.reliefweb.int 
/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6EAH27?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=irq; 
Anthony Shadid, Sunnis go to Polls, This Time, to Retain a Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world 
/middleeast/08sunnis.html. 
7 To be clear, I do not deny and acknowledge as valid any criticism that Iraq 
continues to suffer from problems ranging from appalling infrastructure to 
endemic levels of corruption that border on the pathological.  My point, however, 
is that on balance, Iraq has seen its fortunes improve under this Constitution. 
8 Jason Gluck, Sr. Rule of Law Adv., U.S Inst. of Peace, at the University of 
Pennsylvania Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sept. 
24, 2010) [hereinafter Gluck Remarks].  Gluck has since clarified in a conversation 
with me, indicating that while the central government might have the power to 
tax, fully formed regions could freely overrule such legislation in a manner 
described subsequently, and that this would starve the central government of 
resources should regions additional to Kurdistan be formed.  My own view, as 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/3
HAMOUDI_POSTCONVERSION.DOC 10/6/2011  1:02 PM 
2011] IRAQ CONSTITUTION 1279 
repeated by Rend Al-Rahim.9  Al-Rahim and Ambassador Feisal 
Istrabadi seemed exercised about the broad powers of Iraq’s 
provinces vis-à-vis the central government in Baghdad.10  Al-
Rahim and Gluck both mentioned the danger that Iraq’s existing 
provinces might become near independent regions as permitted by 
the Constitution.11  The young, energetic and intellectually 
formidable Sabah Al-Bawi, the Head of the Division of Legislative 
Drafting at the Council of Representative’s Research Directorate, 
while far more sanguine respecting the Constitution, criticized the 
vagueness of some of its provisions, and hoped that amendments 
might provide further clarity.12 
Throughout the learned and well-considered remarks, one 
theme was preponderant: the Constitution required amendment, 
sooner rather than later, or danger loomed, primarily in the form of 
national division.  We could well have been in 2005, listening to the 
prognostications on the imminent “End of Iraq” described above.  
Somehow, despite all good that has transpired in terms of security 
gains and broad electoral participation—undertaken under the rule 
of the current Constitution—the prevailing belief seems to be that 
the founding document still places the nation on the precipice of 
national disaster, and amendment is the only cure. 
Misguided as I believe them to be, the abovementioned views 
of Al-Rahim, Gluck, Istrabadi and Al-Bawi are based on some set 
of acknowledged fact, as indeed they would have to be to emanate 
from such keen and knowledgeable minds.  The problem is not 
that these erudite scholars and activists are unaware of the changes 
that have taken place within Iraq over the past several years—each 
of them is admittedly passionately and admirably dedicated to Iraq 
and its progress.  The problem is their implicit adoption of a rigid 
and formalistic model of legal and constitutional change, wherein 
 
described in the main text, is that the possibility of region formation is sufficiently 
remote that this need not be considered a present danger. 
9 Rend Al-Rahim, Exec. Dir., Iraq Found., at the University of Pennsylvania 
Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sept. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter Al-Rahim Remarks]. 
10 Id; Amb. Feisal Amin Rasoul Istrabadi, Univ. Scholar in Int’l Law & 
Diplomacy and Dir., Ctr. for the Study of the Middle East, Maurer School of Law, 
Indiana University (Bloomington) (Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Istrabadi Remarks]. 
11 Al-Rahim Remarks, supra note 9; Gluck Remarks, supra note 8. 
12 Dr. Sabah Al-Bawi, Head, Div. of Legislative Drafting, Res. Directorate of 
the Council of Representatives Iraq, at the University of Pennsylvania Conference 
on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq & Afghanistan (Sept. 24, 2010). 
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constitutional language necessarily dictates one possible set of 
outcomes, that which is commonly attached to it at drafting, and 
wherein any change subsequent thereto must be achieved by 
formal amendment.  The only exception, it seems, is where, as Dr. 
Al-Bawi put it, the text itself is poorly drafted, or “vague,”13 a flaw 
that likewise requires correction through formal amendment. 
This model would be subject to rather serious challenge if 
applied in the American context.  Recent work has tended to 
emphasize the importance of constitutional change without formal 
amendment.  I might begin with Bruce Ackerman’s well-known 
analysis of American constitutional history, arguing that 
constitutional meaning is shifting profoundly, even in the absence 
of formal amendment, during certain seminal “constitutional 
moments.”14  More recent work has tended to downplay the notion 
of change during particular periods, providing in its place a 
narrative of continual evolution of constitutional meaning.  Barry 
Friedman’s formidable The Will of the People is a broad history of 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, which demonstrates 
that Supreme Court opinion tracks the popular will as concerns 
constitutional meaning.15  There are even originalists, albeit less 
orthodox ones, who emphasize the possibility of constitutional 
change within the limits of what the semantic content of the words 
might offer.  Most compellingly to this author, Jack Balkin has 
famously suggested that while the constitution’s words, in their 
original meaning, necessarily provide a constraint on future 
legislative action, the original expected application of the founders is 
not necessarily binding.16  Thus, for example, the right to an 
 
13 Id. 
14 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 44–50 (1991). 
15 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 
(Ill. ed. 2009). 
16 Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 549, 552 (2009).  A similar distinction was also advanced earlier by Mark 
Greenberg and Harry Litman between “original meaning” and “original 
expectation.”  Mark Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 
86 GEO. L. J. 569, 573–74 (1998).  More broadly, Balkin’s work draws on the 
considerable achievements of such luminaries as Randy Barnett, Larry Solum, and 
Keith Whittington.  See Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the 
Constitution in Exile, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669 (2004); Larry Solum, Incorporation and 
Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 409 (2009); Keith Whittington, 
Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010).  
Another important early adopter of a similar approach, and one who, like this 
author, sought to reconcile the monumental insights of American Legal Realism 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/3
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abortion might well be defended on originalist grounds as being 
necessitated by the equality provisions of the Constitution, even if 
the drafters would not have expected such a result.17  The changing 
applications derive from the ability of political and social 
movements (more specifically, the feminist movement, in the case 
of the right to an abortion) to change understandings of how 
particular provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment may 
ultimately be applied.18  The semantic meaning of the words of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not thus change, only its expected 
application.19  More broadly, I would maintain that this semantic 
constraint combined with a capacity for change has worked well in 
the American context, permitting the constitution to remain 
relevant to the very legal and political system it is supposed to 
limit.  The same might be said of Iraq inasmuch as the various 
manifestations of federalism, criticized above as being improperly 
handled by the Iraqi Constitution, are concerned. 
In questions following my own remarks outlining these ideas 
at the Penn Conference, Al-Rahim criticized my somewhat liberal 
use of comparative methodologies to describe the Iraq constitution.  
She suggested that there lies a chasm of difference between a state 
with two hundred years of constitutional history and a deeply 
venerated judiciary with a constitutional state barely that is barely 
half a decade old whose judiciary is comparatively untested.  I 
might reply by suggesting that her characterization of the 
American judiciary is, at least as a historical matter, more 
sympathetic than is warranted, even as her characterization of the 
Iraqi judiciary is more critical than I would accept.  Nonetheless, 
this is not in fact the meat of the matter, as Rahim is surely correct 
that America’s judiciary is more deeply venerated than Iraq’s, and 
enjoys considerable historical respect that is absent in the Iraqi 
context.20  The more central, and fatal, problem with Al-Rahim’s 
 
with interpretive constraints offered by original understanding, was Robert 
Clinton.  See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of ‘This Constitution’, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1265 (1987). 
17 Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291, 319–21 
(2007). 
18 Id. at 321. 
19 Id. at 322. 
20 I have explored these ideas at length in a draft article soon to be published 
in the Utah Law Review.  See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Will of the (Iraqi) People, 
2011 UTAH L. REV. 45–61 (2011), available at http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php 
/ulr/article/view/543/404. 
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objection is that the need for constitutional flexibility exists 
irrespective of the strength of the judiciary or the history of the 
constitutional state.  Whether a nation’s judiciary is weak or strong, 
and whether its constitution is two centuries old or has lasted 
barely six years, social and political changes occur, and require 
language sufficiently capacious to address them. 
Empirical research seems to bear out this conclusion.  The 
remarkable work by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton on the 
endurance of national constitutions has shown that flexibility is 
one of three central factors in determining constitutional 
longevity.21  Their work encompasses nearly all national constitutions 
written since 1789, which would include necessarily weak states 
and strong ones, those with comparatively powerful judiciaries 
and those whose judges are incapable of confronting the state.22  
Yet, overall, the authors conclude that the more flexible 
constitutions endured. 
The conclusion, empirically supported as it is, appears logical 
enough.  To use as an example a matter of some debate within 
Iraqi society about which I will have precious little to say in these 
pages, the Iraqi constitution’s provisions on Islam and the state are 
wisely flexible in their drafting.  They neither require all law to 
conform to the dictates of shari’a as determined exclusively by a 
council of scholars, as some Islamist groups would have 
preferred,23 nor do they suggest the absence of any role for Islam in 
legislation, as is the preference of others (Ambassador Istrabadi 
included on the basis of his own remarks at the Penn 
Conference).24  Rather, the provisions indicate that Islam is a 
“foundational source” of legislation, that no law may be enacted 
that violates the “settled rulings” of Islam or the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Constitution, and that the state has some 
responsibility to “guarantee the protection” of the Muslim identity 
of the majority of Iraq’s citizens.25 
 
21 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 81–82 
(2009). 
22 See id. at ix. 
23 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ornamental Repugnancy: Identitarian Islam and the 
Iraqi Constitution, 8 ST. THOM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698447&download=yes, 
at 8. 
24 Istrabadi Remarks, supra note 10. 
25 Article 2, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of 
Iraq] of 2005.  There are other provisions of the Constitution that involve Islam 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/3
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Leaving aside how the Iraqi constitution’s provisions on Islam 
and the state have evolved, the language is capacious enough to 
accommodate the positions of both Ambassador Istrabadi and the 
more religious of Iraq’s political elites given the elasticity of 
phrases such as “settled rulings”, “protection” of Muslim identity 
and “foundational source.”  The language could mean nothing 
more than some form of robust free exercise, prohibiting the state 
from enacting laws banning the headscarf, for example, a 
conclusion I cannot imagine any secularists interested in a political 
future in Iraq would find controversial in the slightest.  On the 
other hand, it could mean active and engaged shari’a review by a 
court with some juristic influence.  The matter of constitutional 
construction on the basis of this framework text is left to those 
succeeding the drafters. 
Imagine, however, if such flexibility were absent—if, that is to 
say, on account of Al-Rahim’s genuine concern on the state of the 
Iraqi judiciary or the weakness of the rising Iraqi state, we were to 
demand amendment of these provisions of the Iraq constitution to 
provide greater clarity on the issue of Islam and its interaction with 
the state.  It seems to me that there would be one of two possible 
results.  In the first possibility the constitution would be subject to 
such frequent amendment based on who happened to win the 
previous set of elections that its role as a unifying fundamental 
bargain would be destroyed.  It is true that the secularist parties 
performed quite well in the national elections held in 2010, though 
some Islamist parties, notably the Sadrists, managed quite well to 
hold their own.26  It would be dangerously naïve to suggest that 
using this electoral momentum to demand further changes to the 
 
and the state, most famously Article 41, which relates to matters of family law. 
Article 41, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 
2005.  It is not my purpose to provide in this brief aside a comprehensive review 
of the relevant provisions of Iraq’s constitution as they concern Islam and the state 
and what they might mean in terms of future construction.  This I leave to an 
upcoming book I am writing on the Iraq Constitution to be published with the 
University of Chicago Press.  Rather, I focus on the general (and extensively 
negotiated) provisions of Article 2 as an example of capacious language from 
which various constructions might be drawn. 
26  Rania El Gamal & Muhanad Mohammed, Iraq’s Allawi Says Open to All in 
Coalition Talks, REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com 
/article/idUSTRE62P42T20100327; Anthony Shadid, Followers of Sadr Emerge 
Stronger After Iraq Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010 /03/17/world/middleeast/17sadr.html?_r=2. 
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Iraq constitution in the direction of secularization27 would not 
inspire Islamist resistance and determination to reverse such 
changes in the future.  Assuming, that is, Islamist parties enjoy a 
future resurgence, a matter I consider a near certainty for no reason 
other than that cyclical politics are what they are, and one must 
assume the fortunes of competing political movements will rise 
and fall as they have over the past decade in Iraq.  However, given 
the rather onerous amendment rules of the Iraq constitution,28 
frequent amendment is unlikely. 
The second possible result of demanding near absolute 
precision from the Iraqi constitution’s provisions on Islam and the 
state would be some form of semi-permanent impasse respecting 
the role of religion in the state.  An impasse is likely because 
permanent agreement is not possible.  In fact, some have decried, 
for good enough reason in certain contexts, the seeming 
unwillingness of Iraq’s political elites to reach much by way of 
compromise on any number of questions.29  Thus, the idea that 
Iraq’s political forces would come together on a matter of such 
historic contention as religion and the state to the extent necessary 
to draft language that is not capacious, not capable of developing 
various constructions within the confines of flexible framework 
text, seems wildly unrealistic.  Our own national debates 
respecting the role of religion in the state should amply 
demonstrate the sensitivities and controversies engendered by 
such matters.  Flexibility, it seems, is the only route available to 
 
27 Technically, Article 126(2) prohibits changes to Article 2 until two electoral 
cycles have passed, which would not occur until the year 2014. Article 126 § 2, 
Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.  My 
point, however, does not relate to the precise date that amendment might first be 
initiated, but rather the costs associated with attempted frequent amendment to 
what is supposed to be a permanent, consensual compact. 
28 The regular amendment procedures set forth in Article 126 of the Iraq 
Constitution require a two thirds vote of the Council of Representatives and 
approval of a majority of those voting in a general referendum. Article 126, 
Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.  
There are special onetime amendment procedures set forth in Article 142 which 
are less cumbersome, but these procedures are not relevant for these purposes, 
first, because they may only be used once, and second, they must be used within 
the first session of the Council of Representatives, which has already ended.  
Article 142, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] 
of 2005. 
29 See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION 226–
27 (2009) (describing the collapse of multi-party negotiations during the 
constitutional drafting process). 
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ensure broad and lasting fidelity to constitutional text on the part 
of rising and falling political movements. 
Yet while Islam and the state might well be a salient example of 
the need for constitutional flexibility, none of the formidable critics, 
with whom I had the pleasure of a fruitful engagement at the Penn 
Conference, engaged this particular matter in much detail.  Even 
Ambassador Istrabadi’s comments on the role of shari’a came in 
response to a question from an audience member.  Rather, the 
panelists’ real concerns, and the related demands for clarity, arose 
out of the federalism provisions of the Iraq constitution.  
Specifically, the core issues were the central government’s powers, 
the powers of the provinces, and the ability of provinces to turn 
themselves into semi-autonomous regions.  In sharp 
contradistinction to my colleagues, I find these particular 
provisions, for the most part and with one significant exception set 
forth below, well-drafted and commendable in their use of 
capacious language that establishes a sensible framework upon 
which future construction might be built. 
I therefore take up the challenge implicit in the broad criticisms 
made at the Penn Conference.  Specifically, I shall demonstrate first 
that the constitutional language is more flexible than the critics 
maintain, and is capable of alternative readings that are more 
centralist in their nature; second, that such alternative readings have 
been operationally deployed, meaning they are the very 
constructions that Iraqi decision makers have developed in 
practice, and third, that this has helped to bring about a broad and 
lasting consensus that was heretofore absent.  Put differently, the 
Iraqi constitution may have not originated as a consensual 
document but was cleverly designed so as to evolve into one, and 
it has so evolved. 
Part Two of this Paper introduces the relevant constitutional 
provisions, outlines the expectations of the drafting parties, and 
suggests alternative readings that are entirely plausible on the 
basis of the text.  Part Three demonstrates how those alternative 
approaches came to be employed, largely because popular will 
demanded them.  Part Four notes precisely why in light of this, 
formal amendment to address these particular matters would 
probably be a mistake.  Part Five concludes on a note of 
concession, and re-characterizes the dispute between my 
colleagues and me as not so much strict formalism on their part, 
nor unqualified anti-formalism on mine, but rather the relative 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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emphasis each of us tends to place on the extent and importance of 
flexibility in constitutional provisions. 
2. FEDERALISM AS FRAMEWORK TEXT 
2.1. The Power to Tax 
Among the most frequent criticisms of the Iraq Constitution is 
that it grants the central government far too limited power in 
Article 110 of the Constitution.30  To use the most salient example, 
the central government, it is frequently maintained, does not even 
have the power to tax.31  What self-respecting sovereign 
government in the modern world, the point seems to be, cannot 
even raise revenue to finance its own activities? 
A review of the negotiating history of Article 110, which lists 
the central government’s enumerated powers, could certainly 
support this conclusion.32  The debate lay largely between, on the 
one hand, Kurdish negotiators and some of the more federalist 
Shi’a parties within the broader Shi’a Coalition, most notably the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (“ISCI”) and, on the other, more 
centralist Shi’a, most notably Da’wa and the Sadrists, along with, 
when they were part of the negotiating process, the Sunni 
representatives.33  The Kurds and federalist Shi’a argued that the 
 
30 Article 110, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic 
of Iraq] of 2005. 
31 Gluck Remarks, supra note 8; Al-Rahim Remarks, supra note 9.  As 
described subsequently in the text, this is a position also adopted by Peter 
Galbraith, an adviser to the Kurds during constitutional negotiations.  GALBRAITH, 
supra note 3, at 199. 
32 See Notes on Iraqi Constitutional Negotiation Documents (Jan. 25, 2010) 
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Constitutional Notes] (recounting the 
contents of the constitutional negotiation documents in the possession of Sh. 
Humam Hamoudi, the author’s paternal uncle and the chair of the constitutional 
drafting committee, appointed by Iraq’s interim legislature at the time, the 
Transitional National Assembly).  The Constitutional Notes are cited in lieu of the 
actual constitutional negotiation documents due to conditions of access placed on 
the author. 
33 The positions of the various parties toward a federal arrangement for Iraq 
are well documented.  See ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 409 (2007) 
(providing a carefully and thoughtfully rendered review of the Sunni position); 
GALBRAITH, supra note 3, at 165–67 (describing the Kurdish position in some 
detail); Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1647–48 (providing excellent background on the 
fissures within the Shi’a coalition on the subject).  As Allawi reports, Sunni 
involvement in constitutional drafting was late in coming, and ultimately the 
Sunnis rejected the final product although it was imposed upon them anyway.  Id. 
at 405, 415. 
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enumerated powers should be limited by adding the term “hasran” 
or (as they understood it) “solely” to the end of the introductory 
phrase “The central government shall exercise the following 
competencies,” meaning that the enumerated powers that followed 
the introductory phrase would then be the sole powers of the 
central government.34  The centralists wanted, in the words of one 
negotiator, to list particular powers, but not to limit the central 
government solely to the exercise of those powers.35  In the end, the 
federalists succeeded in describing the powers of the central 
government as “al-sultat al-hasriya,” or the limited powers, and 
they are indeed extraordinarily narrow and do not include, at least 
explicitly, a power to tax.36 
Yet a more careful linguistic analysis plainly makes another 
reading plausible from the framework text.  The term hasriya, from 
the Arabic hasara, meaning to encircle, encompass or surround,37 
could as easily mean “exclusive” as it does “limited.”  It is 
frequently so used in modern Arabic, to describe an “exclusive 
interview” on an Arabic language satellite channel, for example, as 
any Arabic speaker familiar with Arabic television programming 
(myself included) would know the term to mean “exclusive.”  This 
interpretation suggests that the central government powers 
described in Article 110 are exclusive but not limited, meaning that 
sub-national units may not legislate as to the exclusive areas, but 
the jurisdiction is concurrent as to matters beyond those contained 
in Article 110. 
It should be noted that this reading was not unnoticed even by 
commentators at the time.  While Galbraith maintained 
contemporaneously that the document was clear in containing no 
power to tax, and indeed credits his own “quick thinking” abilities 
as helping to ensure this result,38 Deeks and Burton, perhaps in a 
less “quick thinking” fashion, but certainly giving the matter more 
careful, rigorous and engaged thought, pointed out the alternative 
 
34 Constitutional Notes, supra note 32. 
35 Id. 
36 See Article 110, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the 
Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (lacking any mention of taxation in the enumerated 
powers of the federal government). 
37 THE HANS WEHR DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 212 (J.M. Cowan 
ed., 4th ed. 1994). 
38  GALBRAITH, supra note 3, at 199. 
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possibility, and provide a rather persuasive textual basis for that 
alternative.39 
It is fair to ask why the ambiguity was allowed to remain when 
the drafters could have easily foreclosed any argument respecting 
residual federal power simply by adding a phrase explicitly 
prohibiting the exercise of any jurisdiction beyond that specified in 
Article 110 of the Constitution.  While it is hard to know for certain, 
the opposition of the centralist Shi’a to the more extreme federalist 
vision of Iraq must have played a role.  The possibility of later 
placating the Sunni representatives, who ultimately abandoned the 
constitutional negotiations, was in all likelihood in the drafters’ 
minds as well.40  Whatever the reason, it suffices to say that the 
language is flexible and capable of at least two alternative 
constructions, and that the matter was effectively left to resolution 
at a later time. 
2.2. Asymmetric Federalism 
Whether at the Penn Conference or elsewhere, rare is the 
objection to the fact of broad Kurdish autonomy, with most 
disputes being over the borders of the Kurdish semi-autonomous 
region rather than its existence.41  This seems natural enough, the 
Kurds have enjoyed a state of de facto autonomy since 1991,42 and 
the notion that meaningful central control could be exercised over 
them without dramatic loss of life seems fanciful and dangerously 
delusional. 
As a result, what centralists decry in the context of Iraq’s 
constitution is not so much the idea of federalism vis a vis the 
Kurdish region, but rather a broader form of federalism that 
encompasses any other part of Iraq.43  The resulting criticism of the 
Iraq constitution from the Penn Conference, on the basis of the 
remarks of Gluck, Al-Rahim and Istrabadi in particular, is thus 
twofold.  First, it grants far too much power to Iraq’s provinces.  
Second, a particular concern of Gluck, it permits the provinces to 
 
39 See Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting 
History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 70–71 (2007) (discussing that the constitution 
leaves many powers to “law” and inclusive in “law” will likely be “federal law”). 
40 ARATO, supra note 29, at 227; ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 404–05, 415. 
41 See, e.g., id. at 410 (describing the strong, centralist Sunnis as having 
“grudgingly” accepted the reality of the Kurds’ “semi-independent” status). 
42 Id. at 73. 
43 Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1630–31. 
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form semiautonomous regions.44  In other words, centralists call for 
a form of asymmetric federalism, pursuant to which there is a single 
Kurdish region, which alone enjoys substantial autonomy.  I deal 
with each of these criticisms in light of the relevant provisions 
below, pointing out how particular constructions that make this 
result clearly possible. 
2.1.1.  The Powers of the Provinces 
In fact, the Iraqi Constitution does clearly distinguish between 
provinces and regions, and grant considerably greater autonomy to 
the regions.  Article 121(2), for example, permits a region to limit 
the applicability of national legislation,45 and no similar power is 
given to a province.  A region is explicitly given the right to enact a 
constitution, and to exercise legislative, executive and judicial 
powers in Articles 120 and 121(1),46 whereas a province is not.  In 
fact, while a province is supposed to enjoy “broad administrative 
and financial authorities”, these are, under Article 122(2), to be 
defined by a law enacted by the national legislature.47  These 
provisions, it should be emphasized, were plainly negotiated by 
centralist forces, as even the most ardent centralist would in all 
likelihood not object strenuously to permitting some level of 
administrative and financial decentralization, in a manner to be 
determined by the national legislature. 
The sole federalist concession respecting provinces, however, 
creates rampant confusion.  Specifically, Article 115 seems to grant 
priority to provincial legislation over that of the national 
legislature in the event of a conflict between them.48  The problem 
is that, as described above, the provinces enjoy no constitutional power 
to enact a local constitution, or to exercise legislative power pursuant 
 
44 Al-Rahim Remarks, supra note 9; Istrabadi Remarks, supra note 10. 
45 See Article 121 § 2, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the 
Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (“It is a right for the power of a region, to modify the 
implementation of a federal law in the region if there is exists a conflict or 
contradiction as between it and the law of a region, as for matters that do not 
intrude upon the exclusive competencies of the federal government.”) (author 
translation). 
46 Id. art. 120; 121 § 2. 
47 Id. art. 122 § 2 (“[T]he provinces not formed into a region enjoy broad 
administrative and financial authorities, so that they may organize their affairs in 
accordance with the principle of decentralization, and this shall be organized by 
law.”) (author translation). 
48 Id. art. 115. 
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thereto.  To the contrary, the wide “administrative and financial 
powers” they are supposed to exercise come to realization through 
the enactment of national law, and precisely how national law can 
define a power which could then used to supersede the very law 
that gave rise to it is confounding and unworkable. 
I offer no defense to this particular provision, no doubt meant 
as a concession to federalists and designed to create the same type 
of flexibility described above with respect to central government 
jurisdiction or Islam and the state, but done in a far less satisfying 
manner given the impossible contradiction.  Gluck is quick to point 
this out to demonstrate that the Constitution may be flexible, but it 
is not well drafted nor is its flexibility due to wise design, foresight 
or anything other than fortuitous happenstance.  While I do not 
agree, for reasons explored at length throughout this Essay, the 
criticism has some force here.  Suffice it to say, however, despite 
the poor design, it is plain that any number of constructions might 
arise from this rather perplexing arrangement, some of which favor 
centralist visions for Iraq and some of which favor federalists. 
2.1.2. Right of Provinces to Form Regions 
Though a concern, the more divisive matter was not provincial 
power, where, as noted above, the federalists granted broad 
concessions with one area of confusion, but rather the creation of 
regions beyond that of Iraqi Kurdistan.  The concern was, again, 
based in fact.  ISCI had publicly announced the creation of a Shi’i 
super-region before constitutional negotiations had come to an end.49  
One of ISCI’s chief negotiators responsible for the section of the 
constitution addressing provinces and regions called for the 
complete removal of any references to provinces in the 
constitution, because the state should be composed of a capital and 
near-autonomous regions.50  The chief Kurdish negotiator for the 
same section advanced the same proposition.51 
This federalist aspiration was a centralist nightmare.  The 
provisions of the Constitution respecting broad regional 
autonomy, to the extent they applied solely to the Kurdish region, were 
for the most part uncontroversial, or at least met with grudging 
acceptance.  To the extent they applied elsewhere, an 
 
49 ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 408. 
50 Constitutional Notes, supra note 32. 
51 Id. 
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insurmountable division arose.  Such broader provisions were, for 
the federalists, uncompromisingly essential, and for the centralists, 
deeply objectionable, so much so that the most hardened 
centralists, by and large the Arab Sunnis, abandoned the 
negotiations rather than engage so much as the possibility of a 
regionalized Iraq.52 
In the end, the constitution offered what, to my mind, is the 
only reasonable compromise that could have been achieved—
democratic decision-making on a province and province basis.  The 
process involved three steps.  The first step was the enactment of a 
law by Iraq’s legislature respecting the formation of regions.53  The 
second step was that one third of the representatives of the 
relevant provincial legislatures, or one tenth of the population of 
the relevant provinces, needed to petition for a referendum to form 
a region.54  Finally, a referendum would be held to decide the 
matter for the relevant province or provinces.55 
Admittedly, the process for regional formation was 
comparatively simple.  Supermajorities were not required; in fact, 
only one third of the provincial legislature or one-tenth of the 
relevant voting population would need to support the measure in 
order to proceed to referendum.  Nevertheless, the constitution did 
not foreclose a relatively centralized state with a single federal 
region (as the centralists wanted) or a highly federalized one with 
three or more regions (as the federalists desired).  Instead, it left the 
matter to be determined by subsequent legal action or by a form of 
post-enactment constitutional construction, to use Balkin’s term. 
3. FEDERALISM AS CONSTRUCTED 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of the constitution from my 
colleagues at the Penn Conference, it is clear that in post-enactment 
constructions, the centralists have prevailed mightily in imposing 
their construction of an asymmetrical federal state onto the 
 
52 ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 409–11. 
53 This step was a result of a phone call placed by President Bush to Shi’i 
leader Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, urging the latter to offer more concessions to the 
Sunni centralist forces.  Robert H. Reid, Associated Press, Constitution Heading to 
Parliament, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 27, 2005); see also Constitutional Notes, supra note 
32 (demonstrating the concessions on the date following President Bush’s call). 
54 Article 119, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [Constitution of the Republic of 
Iraq] of 2005. 
55 Id. 
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constitution’s framework text.  They have been so successful that 
the most centralist forces, the Arab Sunnis, originally disenchanted 
with the Constitution, have come to accept and even promote it as 
the fundamental bargain upon which the state is built.  The Iraqiya 
list, which enjoyed broad Sunni support in the March 2010 
elections, has seen many of its leaders, Sunni and Shi’i, advance its 
position that it had the right to form the government on the basis of 
constitutional text.56  Far from decrying the Constitution, the chosen 
representatives of the Sunni Arabs have defended and legitimized 
it, and indeed accused their adversaries of violating it.57  The 
reason for this broad acceptance, by the very forces that once voted 
against the constitution, is clear.58  On every relevant question 
regarding constitutional construction, the centralists have won. 
Even more importantly for our purposes, they won by virtue of 
having the benefit of a wisely drafted, sufficiently flexible, framework text 
upon which they could establish their constructions. 
The reason for this dramatic post election centralist triumph is 
simple enough and draws on Friedman’s insights respecting the 
primary agent of constitutional change: popular will.59  There was 
simply no appetite for a federal Iraq among Iraq’s Shi’a population.  
The regionalization effort was particularly telling.  The national 
legislature managed to pass a law permitting regional formation, 
but just barely, with 140 representatives attending the vote, just 
two above quorum, because of a large parliamentary boycott in 
protest.60  Beyond this, the regionalization initiative proved to be 
 
56 To provide a few representative examples, the leader of the Iraqiya list, the 
secular Shi’i Ayad Allawi, described efforts designed to prevent him from first 
opportunity to form a government as “a confiscation of the will of the Iraqi people 
and our constitution. . . .”  Ned Parkers, Ex-Premier Demands New Election In Iraq, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A5.  Another Iraqi leader, former Vice President and 
leading Sunni Tariq al-Hashimi was reported in May of 2010 to have “restated” 
the Iraqiya position that it be given the first opportunity to form the government, 
pursuant to constitutional mandate.  Stephen Lee Myers, Iraqi Politicians Break 
Bread, But Not Their Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A11.  Finally, Hashimi 
had earlier described his use of a presidential veto as necessary because required 
by “the constitution and the principles of justice.”  World Briefing: Iraq, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/16/world/fg-briefs16.S1. 
57 Id. 
58 ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 415–16. 
59 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 9. 
60 Kirk Semple, In Victory for Shiite Leader, Iraqi Parliament Approves Creating 
Autonomous Regions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A12; Amit R. Paley, Parliament 
Approves Measure Allowing Autonomous Regions, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006 
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an abject failure.  An effort was made to gather petitions to allow 
Basra to put the question of region formation on the ballot, on the 
assumption that Basra was by far the most sympathetic to 
federalist interests.  The 10% threshold was not reached, even in 
this supposedly sympathetic province.61  During this time, 
federalist factions within the Shi’a base, most notably ISCI, 
suffered dramatic electoral defeats to centralist forces, led by 
current Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, causing them to quietly 
shelve their regionalization plans, seemingly abandoned by the 
end of 2010.62 
From this success, other constructions followed.  As to the 
matter of provinces, the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq in an 
advisory opinion dealt with the incompatibility of Articles 115 and 
122(2) by ignoring Article 115, emphasizing that the province has 
no legislative capacity except that which the national government 
chooses to give to it.63  This had the result of rendering national 
law supreme over provincial law. Though the Court has hardly 
held to any level of consistency in the matter,64 the legislature soon 
thereafter enacted the Law of Provinces Not Formed into a Region, 
No. 21 of 2008, in which national law supremacy is described in 
quite certain terms through permitting the enactment of local law 
on matters of administration and finance, but only to the extent that 
 
(citing Qassim Abdul Zahra & Lee Keath, Iraq Parliament Passes Law to Allow 
Setting Up Federal Regions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 12, 2006)). 
61 Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1631–32. 
62 The results of the provincial elections held in April 2008 are available on a 
variety of reputable and publicly available websites.  See, e.g., Kholoud Ramzi, 
Final Election Results, NIQASH: BRIEFINGS FROM INSIDE AND ACROSS IRAQ (Feb. 25, 
2009), http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2395&lang=0 
(providing election results for 14 of 18 provinces). 
63 Federal Supreme Court (Iraq), Advisory Opinion 9 of 2007. 
64 Around the same time that it issued advisory opinion 9, it also around the 
same time issued another ruling, Decision No. 13 of 2007, which indicated 
something of the opposite respecting lawmaking powers.  The Provincial Council 
of Basra, confused as to the Court’s position, asked for clarification respecting this 
contrast, but referred to a conflict as between Decisions 13 and 16 rather than 
Opinion 9 and Decision 13.  Rather than provide any clarification to the Basra 
Provincial Council and the balance of the Iraqi legal community, the Court only 
pointed out in Decision 21 of 2010 that there was no conflict as between Decisions 
13 and 16, thereby refusing the answer the question because of a mistaken cross 
reference.  Advisory Opinion 9 of 2007 has since been removed from the Iraq 
Supreme Court’s website, as the case listings were reorganized, though clearly, as 
the Basra example shows, the earlier opinion has not been forgotten.   
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such local laws do not violate national law.65  Furthermore, while the 
law grants substantial other authorities to the province, among 
them the power to impeach an unpopular governor66 and to 
remove Baghdad appointed high Ministry officials responsible for 
the relevant province,67 it would be properly described more as 
modest decentralization than the type of confederal arrangement 
enjoyed by the Kurds. 
Although the law remains a new one, it is constantly subject to 
challenge and is a source of competition between center and state. 
Interestingly, however, such conflict does not generally lie with 
respect to the matter of conflicting laws and its national law 
supremacy provisions.68  The provincial councils seem to have 
accepted with some level of equanimity Baghdad’s supreme 
authority as concerns such matters, and instead raise challenges on 
issues such as the impeachment of governors or the means by 
which they are elected.69  The disputes, that is to say, are well 
within the orbit of those one would expect in a generally 
centralized state enjoying modest decentralization. 
Naturally, given the centralist successes, it should come as no 
surprise that irrespective of what Al-Rahim, Istrabadi and 
Galbraith have at varying times professed, the central government 
does have powers beyond those set forth in Article 110.  Praxis 
bears out this conclusion; the national legislature has without 
noticeable objection from any faction, including the federalist Kurds, 
enacted legislation that lies well beyond the purview of Article 110 on 
repeated occasions.  These include laws on nongovernmental 
 
65 Law of Provinces Not Formed into a Region No. 21 of 2008 (Iraq), art. 2, 
available at http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=227&id=2159 
&lang=0. 
66 Id. art. 8. 
67 Id. art. 9. 
68 Questions respecting reverse supremacy are raised sporadically before the 
court.  There is Decision 20 of 2010, respecting the applicability of national health 
regulations.  In addition, in Decision 6 of 2009, the provincial council of Babylon 
asked whether or not reverse supremacy exists in Article 115 of the Constitution, 
and the Court decided unhelpfully that it did.  However, the number of such 
cases is miniscule relative to the litigation concerning other aspects of the 
Provinces Law. 
69 See Federal Supreme Court (Iraq), Decision 58 of 2009 (upholding 
provincial council dismissal of Salahuddin Province); see also Federal Supreme 
Court (Iraq) Decision No. 20 of 2009; Federal Supreme Court (Iraq) Decision No. 
24 of 2009; Federal Supreme Court (Iraq) Decision No. 35 of 2009 (dismissing all 
questions regarding the election of governors for lack of jurisdiction). 
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organizations,70 consumer protection,71 the environment,72 and 
competition,73 to name but a few.  The Council of Representatives 
has even exercised the power to tax through amending a tax law.74  
Having worked on some of these laws when produced by the 
relevant committees, not once did I observe any sort of 
jurisdictional objection respecting any one of them.  Certainly 
nothing that the Federal Supreme Court has issued has ever 
suggested that these laws are unconstitutional because beyond the 
jurisdiction of the central government.  The matter, it seems, is 
settled rather conclusively for the moment; and, attendant concerns 
about the national government’s power to tax, or exercise other 
competencies beyond those set forth in Article 110, seem 
misplaced. 
4. ON THE PROBLEM OF FORMAL AMENDMENT 
In light of the resolutions reached above, the criticisms of my 
colleagues to the constitution appear particularly confounding in 
some ways.  Why does it matter that the central government’s 
power to tax is capable of alternative constructions from the 
framework text, if the one broadly adopted without controversy is 
the one that gives the central government such power?  What 
danger will materialize if there is a dissolution of province from 
center via Article 115 under circumstances where one branch of 
government, the judiciary, has declared that provision effectively 
meaningless as against the provinces (at least on occasion), and 
another branch, the legislature, has enacted legislation to that 
effect, which legislation has received broad acceptance in province 
and center alike?  Is it not clear from the dismal failure to gather 
the support of even 10% of Basra’s voting population that the 
efforts at regionalization have been abandoned?  Or, put more 
broadly into a single question, why must we talk about the 
constitution being the source of national dissolution when every 
conceivable construction of the constitution’s framework text has been 
established in precisely the opposite direction? 
 
70 Law on Nongovernmental Organizations, No. 12 of 2010 (Iraq). 
71 Consumer Protection Law, No. 1 of 2010 (Iraq). 
72 Protection of Wild Animals Law, No. 17 of 2010 (Iraq). 
73 Competition Law, No. 14 of 2010 (Iraq). 
74 Law Amending the Property Tax Law No. 162 of 1959, No. 1 of 2009 (Iraq). 
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I am perfectly happy to concede that Iraq’s constitution could 
have been constructed in a fashion that would have made Iraq a 
very loose confederation of semi-independent regions with little 
uniting them beyond geographic proximity.  There is no doubt that 
this could have led ultimately to national dissolution, a point that 
Gluck emphasizes and I accept as correct.  I am further happy to 
concede that it is at least possible that some political forces more 
powerful during drafting than at present might have found such a 
result satisfying.  None of that changes the fact that current social 
and political realities have layered onto the constitution an 
alternative construction, one far more centralist in character, 
rendering such dangers exceedingly remote.  Why then the 
concern? 
Several possibilities present themselves.  The first, and most 
likely, is some form of reflexive formalism.  That is, figures as 
intelligent and deeply involved in Iraq as Istrabadi and Al-Rahim 
are aware of the considerable changes that have taken place in Iraq 
since the adoption of the Constitution in 2005.  As a result, we 
would likely not debate long on the reality of those changes.  But 
one more enamored of formalism, perhaps more reflexively than as 
a chosen intellectual position, would not dismiss as readily as I 
have the milieu in which the constitution was drafted, by which I 
mean they would pay much less attention to subsequent construction 
and interpretation than I might.  I can only characterize this as a 
mistake, one that if applied in the American context could lead one 
to worry about the possibility of segregation,75 the permissibility of 
social security and a prohibition on paper money.76  Needless to 
 
75 General scholarly consensus is that explicit racial segregation was not 
considered to be objectionable by the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (“Even a judge who believes that abstract justice requires 
economic equality cannot interpret the equal protection clause as making equality 
of wealth or collective ownership of productive resources . . . .”); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 728 
(1988) (“[T]he argument that the framers had two relevant and contradictory sets 
of intentions lacks any historical foundation.”); but see Michael McConnell, The 
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral 
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1997) (“[T]he principle 
of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘something more robust’ than the 
requirement that laws be enforced in accordance with their terms.”). 
76 See John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and 
Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 836 (2009) (pointing out that the authority to 
enact social security or issue paper money under the U.S. Constitution is subject to 
challenge). 
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say, I know very few American lawyers or political actors so 
concerned that such rulings are imminent. 
A second possible objection relates to some form of an aesthetic 
preference.  If the Iraqi central government has the power to tax, 
that is, then it simply seems to be better technical drafting, and 
more satisfying, to see this reflected clearly and without ambiguity 
in the text.  This is not necessarily because consequences attach, but 
because good writing is clear, and the constitution on such matters 
is anything but.  I cannot imagine any one of my colleagues 
adhering to such a preposterous position and so, to be absolutely 
clear, I do not ascribe it to them.  Nonetheless, as I think others 
might raise such matters, I dispense with it readily enough.  As 
Ackerman and Nou have pointed out, any constitutional lawyer 
knows that formal amendment is the avenue by which 
constitutional meaning is changed only when no other options 
present themselves.77  Amendment is costly, cumbersome and 
difficult to achieve.  It engenders resistance, and it opens wounds 
previously sealed by consensual text.  It raises the possibility of 
profound, lasting and dangerous disagreement on core matters.  
The notion that such a daunting undertaking should be initiated 
for no reason other than that the product looks better that way is 
utterly misguided. 
Finally, and this much wiser objection I can well attribute to Al-
Rahim and Gluck, who raised the matter in the Penn Conference, 
there is the concern of future reversal.  It is true, Al-Rahim and 
Gluck both indicated in their objections to my presentation, that to 
date, the provinces have shown no desire to regionalize.  There is 
no guarantee, however, that at some point they will decide they 
have had enough of Baghdad’s incompetence and seek 
regionalization.  Only formal amendment could prevent such a 
process. 
This is the most salient reason to seek formal amendment, 
albeit insufficient.  Here, my colleagues would certainly be correct 
to criticize any attempted comparison on my part to the American 
context as facile, as plainly the possibility of America reinstituting 
segregation given the long, painful history of the civil rights 
movement is exceedingly remote and cannot credibly be compared 
to a reconsideration of central government powers in Iraq 
respecting tax, for example.  To do so would be to trivialize the 
 
77 Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The 
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 67 (2009) 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
HAMOUDI_POSTCONVERSION.DOC 10/6/2011  1:02 PM 
1298 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:5 
civil rights movement and its enormous social and political 
achievements.  As such, I will refrain from making such 
comparisons. 
I will say, however, that to the extent that more federalist 
conceptions were at one point earlier in Iraq’s very young 
constitutional history possible, or even likely, they are considerably 
less so today.  Constructions have staying power.  The actors who 
have adopted them have grown comfortable with them, and 
wholesale abandonment will not be undertaken lightly even 
though adjustments will certainly be made as time goes on (in 
particular, over the nature and scope of the administrative and 
financial decentralization granted to the provinces under the Law 
of Provinces).  This is particularly because any such change will 
require significant shifts in attitudes among the Arab population to 
the very state they imagine Iraq to be: a centralized Arab one with 
a proud history that is prominent and an important part of the 
broader region. 
I do not mean to suggest that the matter of regionalization is 
impossible.  I suppose Al-Rahim is correct that regionalization and 
confederalization is possible, though to my mind, it would require 
much more than prolonged central incompetence on the part of 
Baghdad.  It would require an accompanying disenchantment with Iraq 
as nation such that Iraq’s Arab citizens look upon themselves as 
being from the people of Basra, Mosul, or Nasiriya rather than Iraq.  
In addition, I imagine that such an important change in attitudes 
and preconceptions would require a set of circumstances so dire 
that, to my mind, the constitutional flexibility enabling this would 
be a matter to be welcomed.  I cannot see what is gained by 
insisting that Basra follow Baghdad’s dictate under (hypothetical) 
circumstances where Baghdad has underfunded Basra and, more 
importantly, Basra’s citizens no longer view the very conception of 
Iraq with any sort of deep affinity, in a manner characteristic 
perhaps of Iraq’s Kurds.  Such rigidity under such circumstances, it 
seems, would only lead to the constitution’s premature death, if 
the trends highlighted by Melton, Elkins and Ginsburg78 are 
sustained in the Iraqi context. 
 
78 See discussion and sources cited supra note 21 (respecting endurance of 
national constitutions when sufficiently flexible). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
I have related the dispute between my colleagues and me in 
rather Manichean terms, and I hope that I have not 
mischaracterized their valuable opinions or reduced them to 
caricature in doing so.  In the interests of ensuring that no such 
mistake was made, this conclusion offers me an opportunity to 
qualify my above remarks, and perhaps walk back my claims to 
the extent that they have been overstated. 
While I do not share the view that there is no formalist-realist 
divide in our academy, I would certainly concede that the 
respective positions are made to appear more extreme than they in 
fact are.  To that end, I should make clear that I know that my 
colleagues do not deny the possibility of constitutional construction, 
nor do they necessarily demand absolute clarity in constitutional 
language.  Gluck in particular has made clear that flexibility at 
times is desirable and can be made to work.  Similarly, while I have 
emphasized post-enactment construction, my embrace of Balkin’s 
originalist model should, I believe, make rather clear to the casual 
reader that the words of the constitution as originally drafted mean 
something.  To return to my earlier example respecting Islam and 
the state, the constitutional language, while being flexible, does not 
support the vesting of any sort of political authority in a jurist 
determined by whatever process to be Supreme Leader.  The 
notion that language may be capacious so as to address evolving 
social, political and economic needs is not equivalent to saying that 
language may mean anything. 
In the end, our disagreement is perhaps less about category 
than about extent—that is, they feel, perhaps to differing extents, 
that the constitution offers too much flexibility, that its formal 
language is insufficiently constraining, that post ratification 
constructions, while undeniable, are not strong enough to overcome 
what they view as textual flaws and, in Gluck’s case, severe 
problems in design caused by hasty drafting.  Needless to say, as I 
have outlined at some length, while I would not advance the 
notion that the constitution is by any means flawless, in general its 
flexibility is salutary, and has been proven so by post ratification 
events and constructions.  Our exchange at the Penn Conference 
was fruitful, and extraordinarily edifying as a result.  I will not 
deny that it has allowed me to better defend some of my positions, 
and reconsider and adjust others in the favor of formal text.  I can 
only hope that I might have been able to do the same for my 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
HAMOUDI_POSTCONVERSION.DOC 10/6/2011  1:02 PM 
1300 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:5 
valued colleagues.  More importantly than this, I hope that this will 
not be our last opportunity for engagement on this matter. 
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